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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2000, Stephen Derrig, an Akron firefighter, went to a number of doctors
seeking a diagnosis for his breathlessness and fatigue.2 Laying in a hospital bed he
was told that he had tested positive for HIV, which had progressed to AIDS.3 Derrig
is a heterosexual man who is married.4 Luckily, neither his wife nor his children has
been diagnosed with the virus.5 He is not an intravenous drug user.6 He contracted
the disease while at his job, as a fire fighter.7 It is not known by whom he was
infected.8 As a firefighter he has assisted countless people.9 He does not know in
which encounter he contracted the infection.10 He assumes he became infected on
the job because he does not engage in any of the behaviors that are typically
associated with HIV transmission.11
He went public with his case in order to shatter the misperceptions surrounding
AIDS.12 He believes that an infected public safety employee should continue to
work in his or her position.13 One of the differences from Derrig’s time of infection
to today is awareness. The medical profession and governmental agencies have
publicly stated the employees in fields where transmission is a possibility should be
able to continue in their positions as long as universal precautions are utilized.
Physicians have offered their support to Derrig.14 Derrig is back to work staffing
the fire truck.15 He is not serving in his former position as a firefighter. Contrary to
2
Julie Wallace, Akron Man Wins Workers’ Compensation for Disease He Knows He
Contracted on the Job, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Oct. 13, 2002, at A1.
3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Id.

7

Julie Wallace, supra note 2, at 2.

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id. at 3.

11

Wallace, supra note 2, at 3.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Wallace, supra note 2, at 4.
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popular belief the position transfer is not due to the fire department being fearful of
transmission, but that Derrig would be compromising the fragility of his immune
system.16
Dr. Trish Perl, M.D., at John Hopkins Hospital and Health System in Baltimore,
oversees a committee that devises work plans for employees who have contagious
diseases.17 She claims, “ [All] too often people want to spirit away the worker out of
fear he or she will spread the disease.”18 She argues that with simple precautions it is
not necessary for an employee to quit.19 The precautions will provide enough
protection to contain the disease. She points out that neither Derrig’s wife nor
children have the disease, which verifies that the disease is not easily transmittable.20
Society, including the legal profession, fears the risk of transmission of HIV in an
occupational setting. This is particularly true for those in the health care and public
safety settings (fire fighters, police, and healthcare practitioners). This note will
assert that the law should afford HIV infected public safety and healthcare
employees the right to continue in their occupations. According to current medical
evidence, when public safety and healthcare employees use universal precautions the
risk of transmission to a person(s) assisted is insignificant.
At the beginning of the epidemic, the medical profession had yet to conduct
research, and the risks of HIV/AIDS were largely unknown. Under those
circumstances, it is understandable that the courts may have been overly cautious
when confronted with cases involving HIV/AIDS. However, twenty years after the
epidemic surfaced, the medical evidence should calm irrational fears that have
plagued society. The misguided fear arises because the job duties of public safety
and healthcare personnel may include direct contact with bodily fluids.
Currently, the great majority of courts have ruled that HIV infected employees
should not continue in these occupations. Viewed in the light of available medical
evidence and statistical data, these rulings represent an overreaction caused by fear
surrounding the epidemic. These courts have not measured actual risk against the
statutory standards required by the Rehabilitation Act of 197321 and the Americans
with Disability Act (ADA).22 In these cases, the courts have held that when there is
any conceivable risk, no matter how theoretical, the employee must discontinue his
present work. Only a few courts have carefully assessed the medical evidence and
followed statutory guidelines, which permit employees to continue in their
occupations because the risk that HIV public safety and healthcare employees pose
to the public is infinitesimal.
This note will critically analyze decisions that do not support public safety and
health care employees continuing in their professions. The note opens first with an
examination of the history of AIDS and recent treatment of the disease. The second
16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Julie Wallace, supra note 2, at 5.

20

Id.

21

29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).

22

42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq.
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and third sections discuss the statutes and two leading case decisions that involve the
treatment of AIDS. The fourth section will analyze the cases that do not support
employment of HIV persons in the public safety and healthcare fields. The fifth
section discusses cases that favorably treat HIV persons allowing them to continue in
their positions in the public safety and healthcare fields. Finally, in the sixth section
the note will conclude with what one may draw from the present medical evidence
and statistics and how the present treatment of HIV is similar to the past treatment of
persons thought to present a threat of communism.
II. HISTORY AND COMMUNICABILITY OF THE DISEASE
A. History
AIDS first emerged in the mid-1970s in Central Africa.23 One of the first known
persons to be infected with the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was
a surgeon working in Zaire.24 In the 1980’s similar symptoms appeared in New York
City’s gay community.25 It was a disease that seemed to primarily affect one’s
immune system.26 The Center for Disease Control (CDC), the leading federal
agency for protecting the health and safety of people, was unsure how to handle,
prevent, and minimize the impact of the disease.27
In 1981, a French-Canadian flight attendant, known as Gaetan Dugas, was treated
in New York City for a skin condition identified as Kaposi’s Sarcoma.28 The
condition is an ailment of AIDS. Through Dugas’ sexual partners, medical
researchers gained knowledge that the disease was transmitted through sexual
contact.29 By the mid-1980’s, the disease was prevalent in gay communities across
America.30
Two decades ago AIDS was known primarily as a disease that infected gay
men.31 A recent CDC survey showed that more than thirty percent of gay black
males ages twenty-three to twenty–nine in six United States cities have HIV.32
23

MARGARET C. JASPER, AIDS LAW 1 (Oceana Publication, Inc., 2000).

24

Id.

25
26

Id.
See id.

27

Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Nov. 2, 2002, http://www.cdc.gov/about
cdc.htm (last visited Mar. 2003).
28

See JASPER, supra note 23, at 2.

29

See id.

30

Susan J. Levy, The Constitutional Implications of Mandatory testing for Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome—AIDS, 37 Emory LJ 217, footnote 51 citing to Rabin, The AIDS
Epidemic & City Bathhouses: A Constituional Analysis 10 J. HEALTH POL. POLY. 729, 743
(1986).
31

Carol Clark, Paying the price of AIDS, http://archives.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/
aids/stories/social.cost.html (last visited Mar. 2003).
32
Caroline Palmer, Lynn Mickelson, Many Rivers to Cross: Evolving And Emerging
Legal Issues in the Third Decade of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 455,
464-465 (2001).
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However, today it is a disease that infects people of every age, nationality, and
sexuality.33 Presently, there are approximately 800,000 to 900,000 people living in
the United States who are infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).34
Each year an additional 40,000 people will become infected.35 Universally, there are
approximately forty million people living with HIV around the world.36
The disease is communicated through sexual contact, the exchange of bodily
fluids, and from mother to child through pregnancy.37 Having unprotected sex,
sharing used needles, and a mother passing the disease to her child through vaginal
fluids or breast-feeding are the most common forms of transmission.38 A person who
is infected with the HIV virus may remain healthy and show no physical effects for
four to seven years.39
Once a person is infected with HIV it is inevitable that the infection will progress
to AIDS.40 The virus invades primarily white cells and body tissues.41 The virus
attaches to the cell and fuses into the cell’s membrane.42 The effect is that the body
is unable to fight off infection and the body’s immune system is compromised.43
Society has reacted to AIDS hysterically, with minimal empathy, logic, or
compassion. A case in 1991 illustrates this point.44 After John Doe was arrested, he
disclosed to police officers that he was HIV positive.45 Later that day, Doe’s car
rolled down a hill and struck a neighbor’s fence.46 The police told the neighbor that
Doe was infected with AIDS.47 The neighbor was very distraught because Doe’s
children and the neighbor’s children went to school together.48 The neighbor

33

Clark, supra note 31.

34

Clark, supra note 31.

35

Clark, supra note 31.

36
Millions Mark World AIDS Day, (Dec. 1, 2002), http://www.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH/
12/01/aids.day/index.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
37

Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402, 407 (N.D. Ohio 1991).

38

DONALD T. DICKSON, HIV, AIDS, AND THE LAW, LEGAL ISSUES FOR SOCIAL WORK
PRACTICE AND POLICY 103-104 (Aldine De Gruyter ed., Hawethorne 2001).
39

Dr. Steve Salvatore, Researchers create 3-D Image of How HIV Attacks June 18, 1998
http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/9806/18/aids.virus.02/index.htm (Mar. 2006).
40
AIDS.org, http://www.aids.org/FactSheets/101-what-is-aids.html (follow “Fact Sheets,”
follow “What is Aids,” follow “Is There a Cure for Aids”).
41

See SALVATORE, supra note 39.

42

Id.

43

See id, supra note 37.

44

Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990).

45

Id. at 379.
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Id.

47

Id.
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Id.
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contacted other parents and the media.49 Consequently, the next day nineteen
children were removed from the school Doe’s children attended.50 These events
occurred because of the irrational fear surrounding the disease.
The disease affects every aspect of a person’s life. The stigma attached to
HIV/AIDS has horrendous consequences. Society’s treatment of the disease causes
a person infected with AIDS to have not only emotional, but financial consequences
as well, such as the loss of the person’s job and health insurance. These are
consequences that may lead to poverty. Despite contrary evidence, society is not
convinced that HIV cannot be spread through casual contact.51
Early on, the government did not address society’s fear of the disease.52 In the
crucial years of the 1980’s, the administration, led by Ronald Reagan, did little to
calm the apprehension and falsities surrounding the disease.53 Twenty years after
AIDS appeared in the United States, the legal profession still struggles with the
coming to terms with the disease, just as much as the rest of the population.
B. Precautions
To prevent the transmission of HIV in occupational settings, leading government
agencies such as the CDC, as well as others, recommend the use of universal
precautions.
One such government agency is the Federal Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). They suggest wearing gloves, protective glasses, and
masks.54 It did not make any of these provisions mandatory until 1992.55 Another,
the CDC, identifies some of the same precautions such as the use of gloves, gowns,
aprons, masks, or protective eyewear, which can reduce the risk of exposure of the
health care worker's skin or mucous membranes to potentially infective materials. In
addition, under universal precautions, the CDC recommends that all health care
workers take precautions to prevent injuries caused by needles, scalpels, and other
sharp instruments or devices. 56
The following is a partial list of universal precautions that the CDC publishes:
1) Employees should wash their hands as soon as feasible following
contact with blood or other infectious diseases.57
49

See Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. at 379.

50

Id.

51

See DICKSON, supra note 36, at 4.

52

Caroline Palmer & Lynn Mickelson, Many Rivers to Cross: Evolving And Emerging
Legal Issues in the Third Decade of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV., 455,
459 (2001) (discussing the changes in laws that affect people with HIV/AIDS throughout the
United States).
53

Id.

54

See WALLACE, supra note 2, at 4.

55

See id.

56

Universal Precautions for Prevention of Transmission of HIV and Other Bloodborne
Infections, (1987) http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/hip/Blood/UNIVERSA.HTM, (last visited Mar.
2003).
57

29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(d)(2)(vi) (2003).
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2) Contaminated needles and other contaminated sharps shall not be bent
or recapped unless the employer can demonstrate that no alternative is
feasible.58
3) Contaminated needles shall be disposed of in puncture resistant
containers.59
4) An employer shall have an exposure control plan in place and update it
annually.60
When a person follows these precautions there is an extraordinarily small
possibility of transmission. In July 1991, the CDC acknowledged that HIV infected
healthcare workers generally pose no risk of transmitting HIV if universal
precautions are followed.61 The CDC indirectly asserted that when the workplace
adopts a policy of universal precautions, the probability of transmission is virtually
eliminated.62
C. Statistics on Occupational Transmission
The crucial question posed to society is if an HIV positive public safety or health
care employee endangers the life of a person that they assist. In July 1991, the CDC
acknowledged that an HIV infected healthcare worker posed no risk of transmission
to a patient if the worker adhered to universal precautions and did not perform
invasive procedures.63 Realistically, it is quite improbable for a healthcare or public
safety employee to infect a patient.
Studies have shown that a vast majority of occupational transmissions of HIV
occur through needle sticks, where a healthcare or public safety employee
administers an injection. Therefore for a healthcare or public safety employee to
infect a patient or victim by this means, the worker would first have to stick
themselves with a needle and then use the contaminated needle and poke the person
assisted. To transmit the infection otherwise would require a similarly extraordinary
combination of events such as a worker cutting himself and then bleeding directly
into the open wound of the person assisted.
The improbability of occupational transmission to a patient or victim is
evidenced by the fact that there are only six reported patients who have contacted
HIV from a healthcare worker or a public safety employee since the beginning of the
epidemic twenty years ago. Only one healthcare worker, Dr. Acer, a dentist
practicing in the state of Florida, infected all six patients. After the state
investigated, it was reported that Dr. Acer did not use the recommended universal
precautions. In addition, his office had no written policy for sterilizing dental

58

29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(d)(2)(A) (2003).

59

29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(d)(2)(viii)(A) (2003).

60

29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(1)(C)(iv) (2003).

61

Patient Care Delivery Issues, 1 Health L. Prac. Guide § 10:11 (2002).

62

Ursula Smith, Modes of Transmission, Testing for HIV Antibodies, and Occupational
Exposure to HIV, Vol. 98, NURS. TIMES, No. 6, 42 (Feb. 7, 2002).
63

1 Health L. Prac. Guide § 10:11 (2002).
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instruments and equipment.64 The observer is left with the impression that
something extremely untoward and outside the realm of normal medical practice
occurred in these six cases.
Many more HIV transmissions have occurred from patient to health care and
public safety employee, rather than from health care worker/public safety employee
to persons assisted. In the twenty years of the epidemic, there have been ninety-three
reported cases of HIV transmissions from a person being assisted to a health care
worker or public safety employee.65
Fifty-six percent of the ninety-three
transmissions have been to health care workers. Most occur through contaminated
needle stick injuries.66 This usually occurs after the health care employee has treated
the patient and is disposing of the needle.67 It is less likely that an assisted person
would contract the disease from a public safety worker. Logically, the public safety
employee would first have to puncture or cut himself or herself to transmit the
disease to an assisted person. While the CDC acknowledges that some cases may go
unreported, it is reasonably safe to conclude that the number of transmissions to
health care and public safety workers establishes a benchmark for the outer limit of
transmissions to patients and victims.68
The risk of contracting HIV from a health care or public safety employee is
staggeringly small when one considers the number of employees in public safety and
health care professions and the number of people they are assisting. The Department
of Labor statistics indicate that there were 599,550 police officers69, 275,730
firefighters70, 170,690 paramedics71, and 8,972,73072 healthcare workers (dentists, lab

64

Smith, supra note 62, at 743, citing Centers for Disease Control, Update: Investigations
of Persons Treated by HIV-Infected Health Care Workers, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 329 (1993). (The report summarizes the preliminary findings of an investigation.
The improper use of needles and syringes aiding in the transmission of HIV.)
65
Ippolito, Puro, Heptonstall, Jagger, De Carli, & Petrosillo, Occupational Human
Immunodeficency Virus Infection in Health Care Workers: Worldwide cases Through
September 1997, CID 1999; 28.
66

See id. The CDC declared that the risk of HIV transmission to a health care worker from
a patient after “percutaneous exposure to HIV infected blood is approximately 0.3 percent.”
This standard has yet to be modified in any fashion. The CDC defines exposure prone
procedures as the “digital palpation of a needle tip in a body cavity or simultaneous presence
of a health care worker’s fingers and a needle or other sharp instrument in a poorly visualized
or highly confined anatomic site.” 1 Health L. Prac. Guide § 10:11 (2002).
67

Id.

68

Id.

69

U.S. Department of Labor, http://www.bls.gov (last visited Mar. 2003). The author will
assume for purposes of analysis that there have been ninety-three transmissions to patients and
victims during the twenty-year course of the epidemic (follow “Occupations, Occupational
Employment Statistics, overview” follow “2002 National Industry Specific Occupational
Employment & Wage Estimate.”)
70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id.
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workers, physicians, nurses) working in the United States in 2001. To arrive at the
risk to date, the number of reported transmissions (ninety-three) is divided by the
number of possible transmissions that could occur between a professional and a
person assisted. To obtain the potential number of transmissions, the total number of
employees is multiplied by the number of average contacts the employee has with
the general public each day. This figure is then multiplied by the number of days in
a year (365), which is multiplied by twenty years.
To calculate the number of contacts an employee has with the public, a variety of
sources were used. A report published by the Department of Justice stated that
police officers have nearly 45 million face-to-face contacts with civilians in a year.73
Using the number of contacts (45 million) and dividing that number of police
(599,550) gives the approximate number of contacts per year per police officer as
seventy-five. To estimate the number of contacts fire fighters and paramedics
average in a day, a national fire survey was used.74 An estimated number of fire and
EMS calls made in the United States is approximately 8,453,854.75 Using this
number divided by the number of fire and EMS workers in the United States
(446,420) calculates to an average of nineteen contacts per year per worker. D.
Underwood is an ophthalmologist who conducted a case study that included the
number of interaction between nine doctors and their patients. Using Dr.
Underwood’s study, an average of thirty-two patients per day are seen by each
practitioner. 76
Using these figures, the risk of a patient or victim contracting HIV in an
encounter with a health care professional or public safety worker is estimated to be
four out of every hundred billion contacts.77 This estimate represents the outer limit
of the risk that exists, because it represents the risk of transmitting HIV from a
person assisted to a health care or public safety worker, which is greater than the risk
of transmission from a worker to a person assisted. The actual risk may be much
lower and may be 6/93rds of this figure (the ratio of the reported transmissions in
73

U.S. Department of Justice, Use of Force by Police, http://www.ojp. usdoj.gov/bjs/
abstract/ufbponld.htm (last visited Mar. 2003).
74

PETER MATTHEWS, PART I 2001 NATIONAL RUN SURVEY, JUNE 2002 (published by
Firehouse).
75

Id.

76

Walter L. Underwood: FACMPE, Improving Doctor/Patient Productivity Through
Patient-Volume Measurement, http://www.ascrs.org/publications/ao/ae92underwood.html
(last visited March 2003).
77

The calculation was done by taking the number of reported cases (93) and dividing that
by the total number of contacts with patients and victims by health and public safety personell
during the course of the epidemic. This total is estimated by adding the total of police
(599,550) multiplied by the number of average contacts per year by worker (75); plus total
number of firefighters (275,730) and EMS (170,690) multiplied by the number of average
contacts per year by worker (19); plus total number of health care (health care practitioners
and technical occupations 6,001,950 + 2,970,780 = 8,972,730) multiplied by the number of
average contacts per day by worker (32). The total was then multiplied by days in a year
(365) multiplied by the acknowledged number of years AIDS has been treated (20). The
equation is 93/ (899,325,000 + 169,077,080 + 2.096030E12 = .00000000004 – representative
of the risk of an occupational worker infecting a person that he assists.
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each direction), or 2.6 transmissions out of every trillion contacts.78 The risk of
transmission is so vanishingly small, yet the courts have held that public safety and
health care workers present a significant risk and should not practice in their
occupations.79
An article published by the American Bar Association in 1988 addressed the
pending issue of probability of transmission from health care worker to patient.80
The article emphasized the low risk of HIV transmission in the relationship. The
article argues that it would be unwise and unnecessary to restrict the job performance
of health care workers because of the nominal risk.81 Comparatively, the National
Weather Service estimates the odds of being struck by lightning in the U.S. is one in
615,000. 82 Americans routinely are outside during electrical storms without
worrying about being struck by lightening. Yet, there is a much higher likelihood of
being struck by lightning than contracting HIV when being treated by a public safety
or health care employee. Inherent risk exists in every human activity but at some
point it becomes so slight that it is considered inconsequential.
III. STATUTES
A. Anti-Discrimination Legislation: Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973
and Americans with Disabilities Act
The question that is posed to the courts, is whether a public safety employee who
is infected with HIV or AIDS poses a direct threat to others, which cannot be
eliminated by reasonable accommodation. There are two statutory bodies of law that
protect employees who are disabled from workplace discrimination. Public safety
employees and healthcare workers fall under the protection of the statutes that are
discussed below.

78

Id.

79

The ratio above indicates the low risk that is present from public safety and healthcare
employees to persons they are assisting. An article published by the American Bar
Association in 1988 addressed the pending issue of probability of transmission from health
care worker to patient. Eric N. Richardson & Salvatore J. Russo, Calming AIDS Phobia:
Legal Implications of the Low Risk of Transmitting HIV in the Health Care, 28 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 733 (1995). The article emphasized the low risk of HIV transmission in the
relationship. The article argues that it would be unwise and unnecessary to restrict the job
performance of health care workers because of the nominal risk. Id.
As of 2003, there had been only six reported cases worldwide where patients have been
infected by a health care worker and no reported instances where a public safety worker
infected a person assisted. Id. at 745. The medical evidence suggests that the risk of HIV
being transmitted from public safety or health care worker to patient is extremely low. One
study found that there was “no HIV transmission in 369 person hours of surgical exposure.”
Id. at 744. (citing Audrey S. Rogers et al., Investigation of Potential HIV Transmission to the
Patients of an HIV-Infected Surgeon, 269 JAMA 1795, 1799 (1993).
80

See Richardson & Russo, supra note 79, at 733.

81

Id.

82

David H. Levy, When the Big Clouds Gather, THE PLAIN DEALER, PARADE MAGAZINE 4,
May 18, 2003.
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The Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act)83 protects HIV
infected individuals from discrimination. Section 504 of The Rehabilitation Act
protects “otherwise qualified” handicapped individuals (now “individuals with a
disability”) from discrimination “under any program or activity receiving financial
assistance.”84 “Otherwise qualified” limits coverage by requiring that individual in
question be able to perform the essential functions of the job. In 1974, the definition
of an individual with a disability was expanded: “any person who (i) has a physical
or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such a person’s
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment.”85 To be considered disabled under the Act, the
individual must be substantially limited as to a major life activity.86 Major life
activities are functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, breathing, learning, and working.”87
In 1991, Congress passed the ADA, which expands the coverage offered under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prohibiting private employers that have fifteen or
more employees from discriminating against the disabled.88 The ADA parallels the
Rehabilitation Act in that it uses much of the same language in the legislation.
Under the ADA the definition of a disability is identical to the Rehabilitation Act. A
disability is considered: a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more life activities, or the disability has been of record, or the individual is
perceived as being impaired.89
The ADA provides, “no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to
job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.” 90
83

29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).

88

See JASPER, supra note 23, at 22.

89

Id.

90

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Mandatory HIV testing is lawful only if it can be shown that the
employee poses a direct threat to himself or others. Because the only known way that a virus
can be transmitted is by an exchange of bodily fluids then in most cases there is no need for
mandatory HIV testing.
The American Disability Act (ADA) protects, qualified individuals with a disability from
discrimination based on their disability 86(e). The Right to Privacy and HIV Testing In the
European Community and the United States, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2775, 2800 (1997), citing
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). This includes medical examinations and inquiries. After initial
employment, the statute provides: “a covered entity shall not require a medical examination
and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such an employee is an individual
with a disability or as to the nature and extent of the disability, unless such an examination is
shown to be job related and consistent with business necessity.” See Dickson, supra note 36,
at 138 citing 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(2)(A). If a disabled person is unable to perform all the
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Aside from the ADA expanding coverage to privately employed individuals,
there are some additional differences between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
The Rehabilitation Act inquires as to whether there is a significant risk as an element
of qualification. The ADA, in addition, inquires as to whether there is a direct threat
to others that cannot be eliminated through reasonable accommodations.91 Both of
the statutes protect individuals that are otherwise qualified from discrimination in
employment settings. Several circuits have interpreted the two to be synonymous.92
The ADA expressly provides that “nothing [herein] shall be construed to apply to a
lesser standard than . . . under . . . the Rehabilitation Act . . . or the regulations issued
…pursuant to [it].”93 Another difference is that the Rehabilitation Act includes a
non-exhaustive list of major life activities that a disability may impair. Under the
ADA, there is no inclusive or exclusive list. This enables the ADA to provide
extensive coverage for individuals with disabilities. The 101st Congress stated that
one of the objectives of passing the Act was to protect individuals with HIV.94
Administrative agencies, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), view the ADA as
covering all stages of HIV infection. The EEOC stated “. . . impairments such as
HIV infection are inherently limiting.”95 The DOJ explicitly includes HIV as a
disability in its regulations. The question may arise whether an asymptomatic
individual is considered disabled. If he is disabled then is he entitled to ADA
protection? The DOJ notes that the phrase, “symptomatic or asymptomatic” was
inserted in response to those that thought clarification was necessary.

essential functions of the job, the court may consider whether any reasonable accommodation
by the employer would allow the employee to perform his/her job functions satisfactorily. See
Dickson, supra note 36, at 144.
91

Adam G. Forrest, Note, Is There a Significant Risk or High Probability of HIV
Transmissions from an Infected Health Care Worker to Others? The Sixth Circuits Answer
Lies in Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV 1763, 1768 (1999).
Accommodation is not reasonable if it imposes “undue financial and administrative burdens,”
or if it requires “a fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program.” Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979).
92

See FORREST, supra note 91, at 1768.

93

42 U.S.C. § 12201(a).

94

DICKSON, supra note 38, at 139.

95

Id. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) publishes guidelines that
are quite specific about what is permissible or impermissible to ask prospective employees.
Some of the impermissible subjects to inquire about are: existing impairments, limitations on
life activities, and singling out the individual to perform aspects of the job, but not singling out
others. Some of the permissible subjects that an employer can ask a prospective employee is:
can the employee perform the job, asking every applicant to demonstrate ability to perform,
and asking about required certifications or licenses. Id. at 139, 91(b). Under the ADA,
voluntary examinations are permitted which have been integrated into the employee health
program. See Dickson, supra note 38, at 139, 91(c). A covered entity shall make inquires into
the ability of the employee to perform work related functions. See Dickson, supra note 38, at
139, 91(d). An employer may impose medical tests after hiring, but under the ADA they must
be job related and consistent with business use. Id. at 140, 91.

2004-05]

OCCUPATIONAL RISK: THE OUTRAGEOUS REACTION

51

The United States Supreme Court recently limited the ADA’s coverage. In
Chevron USA Inc. v. Echazabal,96 the Court ruled that if hiring an individual would
pose a direct threat to himself, an employer may refuse to hire the individual without
violating the Americans with Disabilities Act.97 Effectively, this means an employer
not only has the defense that an employee may pose a threat to others, but also that
the employee may pose a threat to himself.98 The ADA and Rehabilitation Act offer
protection to individuals who have disabilities but can perform the essential
functions of a job.99 Judicial interpretation of the requirements of these statutes has
often left individuals with HIV without adequate protection.100
IV. TWO LEADING CASES
A. Asymptomatic HIV as a Disability Under Bragdon v. Abbott
In the 1998 landmark case, Bragdon v. Abbott, the Court raised several issues
involving AIDS as a disability.101 The first issue is whether a disability under the
ADA includes asymptomatic HIV. The second issue is whether a health care
professional can refuse treatment because of the direct threat the patient poses to the
health and safety of others.

96

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S.Ct. 2045 (2002).

97

Id. at 2050.

98

This is an issue that will not be significantly addressed in this note.

99

RANDY S. RABINOWITZ, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 2ND EDITION 900-908
(ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law 2002). In Alabama v. Garrett the Supreme
Court addressed whether the ADA exceeded congressional authority provided under the U.S.
Constitution to enforce the equal protection rights of individuals with disabilities. Bd. of
Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). It came to the conclusion
that the ADA did not meet the level of congruence and proportionality necessary to overcome
the Eleventh Amendment protection to the states. Id. The ADA now joins Violence Against
Women and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as laws deemed unconstitutional
against the states.
100
Another statute that provides protection to employees that are sick or are disabled is the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). See Rabinowitz, supra note 99 at 91, 900-908. The
FMLA gives employees with serious health conditions up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave
with guaranteed reinstatement to the employees’ position. Id. This gives qualifying
individuals additional protection beyond the protection the ADA provides. Id. However, the
employee must meet the criteria of FMLA to be a qualifying candidate. Id. The following are
the main elements that must be met to qualify for FMLA protection. Id. The employers that
are covered under the FMLA are all private employers that have fifty or more employees
within a seventy-five mile radius and public sector employers without regard to their size. Id.
The employee requesting the leave must have been employed for a minimum of twelve
months. Id. The serious injury or illness must meet the FMLA definition of serious health
condition this is typically defined as incapacity or continuing treatment by a health care
provider. Id. He must be unable to perform one or more essential functions of his job to
qualify for FMLA leave. Id. If it is practical the employee must give thirty days notice to the
employer if the leave is foreseeable. Id.
101

Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
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In this case, Sidney Abbot went to the office of Dr. Randon Bragdon for a dentist
appointment.102 On the preliminary medical form, Abbot disclosed she was HIV
positive.103 After finding a cavity, Dr. Bragdon informed her that he could not fill
the cavity in his office but would perform the procedure in the hospital due to her
HIV status.104 Abbott sued Bragdon under the ADA, pursuemt to the applicable
provision of the statute105 that provides:
“No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in
the full and equal employment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any person who operates a place of
public accommodation.”106
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Abbot.107 It held that an
HIV positive person is afforded protection under the ADA.108 The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, restating the premise that the
“Rehabilitation Act does not require the hiring of a person who posed a direct threat
of communicating an infectious disease to others.”109 The issue here was whether
Bragdon could refuse treatment to Abbott based on the threat she posed.110 Under
ADA standards, Bragdon could refuse treatment only if Abbott’s disability “posed a
direct threat to the health or safety of others.”111
The definition for direct threat under the ADA is “a significant risk to the health
or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices,
or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.”112 The Supreme
Court held that objective medical evidence along with the judgment of a health care
professional should determine if a significant risk is present.113 However, the Court
did not cite sufficient material in the record that an HIV positive individual posed no
direct threat to the health and safety of others.114
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Id.
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Id.

104

Id.

105

42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
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42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A public accommodation includes “the professional office of a
health care provider.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(7)(F).
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See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629.
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Id.
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Id. at 626.
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See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 624.
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42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3).
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42 U.S.C. § 12182.
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See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 626.
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Id. at 630.
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The Supreme Court first assessed whether the HIV infection was a disability
under the ADA115 and held that it was.116 In answering this question the Court
addressed three issues: (1) whether the HIV infection is a physical impairment;117 (2)
is the life activity that respondent relies upon considered a major life activity under
the ADA;118 and (3) whether the impairment substantially limits the major life
activity.119
The Court conceded that every agency that has considered the issue of HIV
infected persons that are covered under the ADA has found that they are protected.120
In addition, every court that had been presented with the question if an asymptomatic
HIV individual is covered under the ADA had answered in the positive.121
Plaintiff claimed that having HIV substantially limited a major life activity,
namely pregnancy. The Court stated that, “[i]n light of the immediacy with which
the virus begins to damage the infected persons white blood cells and the severity of
the disease, we hold it is an impairment from the moment of infection.”122 The Court
concluded that becoming pregnant and giving birth were major life activities.123 The
Court stated that contrary to Bragdon’s contention that the ADA only covers public
activities, the ADA covers private activities, such as caring for oneself.124 Because
of AIDS’ lethal outcome and significant possibility of transmitting the disease to her
115
See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 625. “In light of the immediacy with which the virus begins
to damage the infected persons white blood cells and the severity of the disease, we hold it is
an impairment from the moment of infection. As noted earlier, infection with HIV causes
immediate abnormalities in a person’s blood, and the infected person’s white cell count
continues to drop throughout the course of the disease, even when the attack is concentrated
on the lymph nodes. In light of these facts, HIV infection must be regarded as a physiological
disorder with constant and detrimental effect on the infected hemic and lymphatic systems
from the moment of infection. HIV infection satisfies the statutory and regulatory definition
of a physical impairment during every stage of the disease.” Id. at 637.
116
117

Id. at 625.
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 631.
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Id.at 642.
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Id. at 644.
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Id. at 637.
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See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 643. “Our evaluation of the medical evidence leads us to
conclude that respondent’s infection substantially limited her ability to reproduce in two
independent ways. First, a women infected with HIV who tries to conceive a child imposes on
the newborn a significant risk of becoming infected. The cumulative results of 13 studies
collected in a 1994 textbook on AIDS indicates that 20% of male partners of a woman with
HIV, become HIV-positive themselves . . .” (citing Osmond & Padian, Sexual Transmission
of HIV, [in AIDS Knowledge Base1.9-8, and tbl.2]).
“Second, an infected woman risks infecting her child during gestation and child birth, i.e.
prenatal transmission. Petitioner concedes that women infected with HIV face about a 25%
risk of transmitting the virus to their children .” Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641.
124

See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 640.
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husband (through sexual intercourse) and child (through conception), the Supreme
Court held in favor of plaintiff.125
The Court also reviewed another issue asking if a private health care provider
must perform invasive procedures on infectious patients in his office, and if courts
should defer to the health care provider’s professional judgment?126 The Court
considered substantial testimony from a number of health experts indicating that it is
safe to treat patients infected with HIV in dental offices.127 Bragdon asserted that the
use of high-speed drills and surface cooling with water created a risk of airborne
HIV transmission.128 The Court concluded that the study on which Bragdon relied
was inconclusive.129
The Court’s holding demonstrates that respondent’s HIV infection falls within
the ADA’s definition of disability. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the
First Circuit so that Bragdon could produce evidence proving that Abbott posed a
significant risk of transmitting HIV. On remand, the First Circuit held that a
dentist’s cavity filling procedure on a patient does not pose a direct threat to
others.130
B. Arline: The Four Prong Test
In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, the Supreme Court first determined
that a person suffering from a contagious disease can be disabled within the meaning
of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.131 In that case a teacher was fired from her
job because of her tuberculosis infection.132 The termination occurred after her third
relapse of tuberculosis within two years.133 After she was denied relief in state
administrative proceedings she brought suit in federal court claiming that her
termination constituted a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.134
The trial court found it “difficult to conceive that Congress intended contagious
diseases to be included within the definition of a handicapped person.”135 The court
held that even if a person with an infectious disease could be considered a
handicapped person, Arline was not qualified to teach.136
125

Id. at 637.
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Id. at 647.
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Id. at 653.
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Id.
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Id.
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Bragdon v. Abbott, 163 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 1998).
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School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), superseded by statute,
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, PUB. L. NO. 109-173 (amended 1992), as recognized in Shiring v.
Runyon, 90 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 1996).
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Id. at 276.
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The court of appeals reversed.137 It held that “persons with contagious diseases
are within the coverage of section 504.”138 It also held that Arline fit neatly into the
statutory and regulatory framework of the Act.139 The court remanded the case to
determine if the risks of infection precluded Arline from being otherwise qualified
for the job and if it was possible to make reasonable accommodations for her.140
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. When determining if a particular
individual is handicapped as defined by the Act it looked to the regulations published
by the Department of Health and Human Services.141 The Court discussed the
legislative history of section 504 and the Court stated that “history demonstrates that
Congress was as concerned about the effect on an impairment on others as it was
about its effect on the individual.”142 Using history and regulations, the Court held
that allowing discrimination because a disease is contagious is inconsistent with the
purpose of § 504.143
The remaining question was whether Arline was otherwise qualified for the job
of an elementary school teacher. The Court stated that an individualized inquiry
must be made in most cases144 and set forth a four factor test that need to be
considered when conducting an inquiry.145 The four factors include the nature,
duration, severity of the risk, and the probability that the disease will be
transmitted.146 In Arline, the Court held that a person with an infectious disease
“who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease is not
otherwise qualified to perform his or her job.”147 A risk assessment must also be
made as to whether the employer could reasonably accommodate the employee.148 In
making the assessment one should defer to reasonable medical judgments of public
health officials.149
C. Controversial Phrases
Courts have applied the controversial statement in Arline that “a person who
poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the
workplace will not be otherwise qualified for his or her job if reasonable
137
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Id.
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Id.
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Arline, 480 U.S. at 277.
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See Arline, 480 U.S. at 279.
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Id. at 284.
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Id. at 287.
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Id. at 288.
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Id at 287, 288.

147

See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287, 288.
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Id. at 288.
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Id. at 274.
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accommodation will not eliminate the risk”150 in many different ways. The real
question is what constitutes a significant risk. Significance is not controlled by
seriousness of the harm because “significance” relates to probability which is
determined by an individualized inquiry. From Arline, one can infer that the
probability the risk will occur is the real meaning behind the phrase “significant
risk.”151
Federal courts disagree about what the probability must be to be considered a
significant risk. The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have followed a cautious rule.
These courts have held that a theoretical possibility of transmitting AIDS is a
sufficient showing of a “significant risk”. Their view is that, “when transmitting a
disease inevitably causes death the evidence supports a finding of significant risk if it
shows both a certain event can occur and that according to medical opinion that
event can transmit the disease.”152 This risk is not based on a medical opinion or
evidence but instead on theory and fear.
Conversely, the First Circuit has construed the phrase “significant risk” to mean
that there is more than a possibility of some danger.153 In Bragdon, as discussed in
the prior section, Dr. Bragdon refused services to an HIV infected individual. The
Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the HIV infected individual.
The Court stated that “Dr. Bragdon is not entitled to absolute safety.”154 The
Supreme Court’s disposition on the issue of transmission of HIV is that there must
be a significant risk for an individual not to be protected by the ADA or section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. Several circuits and district courts that do not follow the
Court’s reasoning.
V. CASE LAW UNSUPPORTIVE OF HIV INFECTED PUBLIC SAFETY
AND HEALTHCARE WORKERS
A. Health Care
1. Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center
Regardless of existing medical evidence, courts feed on the stigma surrounding
AIDS. They are especially reluctant in healthcare cases to follow the guidance set
forth under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. In Estate of Mauro v. Borgess
Medical Center, the court failed to make a sound judicial analysis when a surgical
technician was terminated from his position upon his employer discovering that he
had AIDS.155 Before terminating Mauro, Borgess organized a task force to
determine if an HIV-positive employee could safely perform the job responsibilities
of a surgical technician.156 The committee determined that Mauro could not perform
150

Id. at 287.
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Id. at 273.
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Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 1999).
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Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F. 3d 934, 948 (1st Cir. 1997).
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Estate of William C. Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1998).
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Id. at 400.
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the essential job functions of a surgical technician if HIV-positive. The district court
granted Borgess’ motion for summary judgment, relying on the four factors laid out
in Arline.157 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed this
holding that Mauro was not otherwise a qualified individual under the ADA.158
Judge Boggs vigorously dissented contending that a “significant risk” means, by
process of elimination, a small risk that is not harmful.159 The court failed to follow
the Supreme Court’s instruction to consider the probability of infection of contagious
disease160 and did not make an individualized inquiry as Arline requires. Arline
specifically states that there must be a direct threat or significant risk for the
employee not to be protected by the Rehabilitation Act.161
In addition, the Sixth Circuit did not take into account Mauro’s expert witnesses,
even though they were both physicians.162 The majority held that a surgical
technician may be required to participate in exposure-prone procedures. The court
simply concluded that because some risk existed, Mauro was not qualified.
By contrast, Judge Boggs recognized that the ADA requires a legal assessment
not “a sense of what we would prefer as an employer or patient.”163 He noted that
the standard of significant risk means that employers may be required to expose their
patients or others to some amount of risk. Judge Boggs stated, “in some way, Mauro
poses some risk. It is not ontologically impossible for him to transmit a disease of
very great lethality. However, the chance that he will do so to any given patient is
‘small.’”164 Judge Boggs pointed out that the court confuses exposure prone
procedures with invasive procedures.165 Mauro testified that, “usually if I had my
hands near the wound, it would be to like, on an abdominal incision, to kind of put
your finger in and hold – kind of pull down on the muscle tissue and . . . pull that
back.”166 There was no testimony that Mauro ever performed any procedures that
would be considered exposure prone. Under these circumstances, Judge Boggs
concluded that it would be more appropriate for a jury to make the decision whether
Mauro posed a significant risk of transmitting HIV to others.167
Unlike the court, Judge Boggs attempted to precisely address the significance of
the risk. The CDC has estimated that, the risk to a single patient from an HIVpositive surgeon ranges from .0024% (1 in 42,000 procedures) to .00024% (1 in
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417,000 procedures).”168 Mauro was a surgical technician who only touched the
wound marginally, if at all. Thus Mauro would pose a lower risk than a surgeon who
only poses a risk ranging from .0024% to .00024%.169 Judge Boggs pointed out that
there is a degree of risk to almost every action.
[T]he perception of the significance of risk is subjective. More than a few
people refuse to fly, though commercial airlines are said to be safe
compared to other modes of transportation. There may be some people
who refuse to cross streets. Others go bungee–jumping. So there is an
inescapable normative component to the judgment of whether the chance
that even a great peril will come to pass is “significant” or not.170
Is this considered significant under the ADA standards? There is no clear answer
because the Mauro court did not define significant risk. Instead, the court reacted to
fear and misguided apprehension.
The Sixth Circuit decided another related case as Mauro that same year, EEOC v.
Prevo’s Family Market Inc.171 The case concerned an HIV–positive individual, and
while not in the public safety or healthcare sector, it illustrates the fear of the court.
The EEOC represented Steven Sharp, a produce worker at Prevo’s Market.172 Sharp
had voluntarily disclosed that he was HIV positive.173 Consequently, he was
reassigned to the cash room.174 Sharp was initially satisfied with the reassignment,175 but shortly after reassignment, he complained of unwanted questions
by fellow employees and no contact with customers.176 He was granted paid leave
and was requested to get a medical exam.177 Sharp did not go to Prevo’s doctors,
instead preferring to go to his own.178 This was not satisfactory to Prevo’s Market,
168

Id. at 409, quoting Doe v. University of Md., 50 F.3d 1261, 1263 (4th Cir. 1995).
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See Jennifer N. Coffin, “While not explicitly discussed in Estate of Mauro, one aspect
of the CDC recommendations that may trouble courts is the reason given by the CDC for not
recommending mandatory testing of health care workers. The CDC reports that “[currently]
available data provide no basis for recommendations to restrict the practice of [health care
workers] infected with HIV who perform invasive procedures not identified as exposure
prone, provided the infected health care worker practice . . . universal precautions.” Quoting
Centers of Disease Control & Prevention Civil Rights Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
Americans with Disabilities Act-HIV-Infected Health Care Workers and the “Direct Threat”
Defense, 66 TENN. L. REV. 311, 326-327 (1998). U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive
Procedures, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Jul. 12, 1991 at 1,4.
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and Sharp was dismissed from his position ten months later.179 The court found that
the job presented a grave enough risk that it was a necessity to require a medical
examination mandated by the employer.180 The court also held that it was lawful to
reassign an employee without any objective evidence that the employee was a direct
threat to others.181
The majority asserted that it was a business necessity that Sharp went for a
medical examination. However, the ADA provides that a covered entity shall not
require a medical examination unless it is shown to be job related and consistent with
a business necessity.182 According to the ADA, a recognized legitimate business
practice is as follows: “1) when an employee is having difficulty performing his or
her job effectively; 2) when an employee becomes disabled on the job or wishes to
return to work after suffering an illness; 3) if an employee requests an
accommodation; and 4) if medical examination, screening, and monitoring is
required by other laws.”183 Sharp’s situation did not fit any of the scenarios.
Judge Moore dissented and indicated the flaws in the majority’s opinion.184 She
analogized the majority’s opinion to treatment of black Americans in the 1940’s.185
She stated that the majority’s opinion would only fuel unfounded fear, prejudice,
ignorance, and myth.186 Judge Moore also cited the CDC, asserting neither HIV nor
AIDS has ever appeared on the list of infectious diseases that could be transmitted
through the handling of food.187
The next major flaw in the majority’s opinion is that after the grocery store
reassigned Sharp, it lawfully could not require a medical examination because it did
not satisfy a business purpose.188 The flaw with the majority’s opinion is that the
very purpose of the ADA is to eliminate discrimination and exclusions that have no
supporting evidence. The dissent also stated that the probability of Sharp infecting a
fellow produce worker was one in ten million under normal circumstances.189 If
there is direct contact then the risk of transmission increases to one in forty thousand
to one in four hundred thousand depending on the study.190 From the statistical data,
no direct threat exists. Even if there were, Sharp could still be a qualified worker if
he could be reasonably accommodated. This could be accomplished by providing

179

Id. at 1092.

180

Id. at 1097.

181

Id.

182

Id. at 1103.

183

Id.

184

Id. at 1098.

185

Id. at 1099.

186

Id.

187

Id.

188

Id. at 1101.

189

Id.

190

Id. at 1102.

60

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 19:39

Sharp his own knives and giving him gloves to wear.191 The dissent pointed out that
the majority singled out Sharp, but failed to acknowledge that using bloody knives is
a risk for all blood borne pathogens.192 Prevo’s should have adopted universal safety
procedures.193 Moore’s dissent condemned the majority opinion, “[in] that it allows
employers to elevate fear over facts, ignorance over information, and mythology
over medicine.”194
2. Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center
In Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center,195 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit similarly engaged in a conclusionary analysis that a
small risk is a significant risk.196 Bradley, also a surgical technician, was infected
with the HIV virus. When his infection became known to the hospital, it reassigned
him to assist in the purchasing department.197 Bradley claimed that his reassignment
violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of defendant and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
The appellate court purported to follow Arline’s four-part test. The court referred
to the guidelines provided by the CDC but failed to heed them. “The CDC states that
‘the risk of transmitting HBV (Hepatitis B virus) from an infected HCW (Health
Care Worker) to a patient is small, and the risk of transmitting HIV is likely to be
even smaller.’”198 The court admitted that the risk of transmission was minimal but it
claimed that it is still significant.199 The court was in agreement with the hospital
that there was no reasonable accommodation that could be made for Bradley.200 The
hospital claimed that even Bradley’s presence in the operating room posed too grave
of a risk for the hospital and its patients.201 The court concluded that Bradley’s HIVpositive status gave the hospital grounds to reassign him.202 The Fifth Circuit did not
give deference to reasonable medical judgments of public health officers at the CDC.
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3. Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation
Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation203 involved a
resident in neurosurgery who was infected with the HIV virus who filed suit against
the University of Maryland for violating the Rehabilitation Act and ADA. Doe was
stuck with an HIV contaminated needle while under the employment of the
hospital.204 He subsequently tested positive for the HIV virus.205 The hospital, after
learning of Doe’s condition, consulted a panel of experts.206 The panel suggested
that Doe be able to continue in his position with the exception of not performing one
procedure that included wire.207 The hospital did not take the advice of its own
panel, instead offering Doe alternative positions in non-surgical fields.208 When Doe
refused to accept another position the hospital terminated him.209
In the words of the district court, Arline factors “discount . . . the severity of
anticipated harms by the statistical probability that they will occur.” 210 Arguably,
the court itself admitted that it did not follow a leading Supreme Court decision. The
factors the court looked at were heavily based on emotion, not the law. In the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s opinion, the court stated “there may presently be
no documented case of surgeon-to-patient transmission, [but] such a transmission
clearly is possible.”211 The ADA and Arline, the two guiding bodies of law, do not
define “significant risk” or a “direct threat” as just a possibility. As Doe argued the
risk cannot be so infinitesimal and still be considered a significant risk.212 The
hospital admitted that the risk of transmission was small and quoted the CDC but
would not follow CDC guidelines.213 The CDC suggests that surgeons should be
allowed to practice invasive procedures but that a hospital may bar HIV-positive
surgeons from exposure prone procedures. The court’s opinion cited to the
possibility of a surgeon cutting himself with a sharp instrument and then bleeding
directly into the patient’s wound.214 The court further declared that there was a
possibility of transmission by Doe to a patient that constituted a grave enough risk.215
The court held that the hospital was not in violation of the ADA or the Rehabilitation
Act.
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4. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc
A recent decision in the Eleventh Circuit, Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental
Associates, Inc., concerned a dental hygienist who was HIV-positive and was
terminated because he could not be reasonably accommodated in accordance with
the ADA.216 Valley Forge employed Spencer Waddell from early 1996 through
October 1997.217 In September of 1997, Waddell was tested to determine if he
carried the HIV virus.218 Waddell was notified shortly afterward that he did indeed
test positive for the virus.219 Valley Forge placed Waddell on paid leave while they
determined what his future would be at Valley Forge.220 After Valley Forge studied
medical journals, it determined that Waddell posed a significant risk and he could no
longer work as a dental hygienist.221 Waddell was offered a clerical job at half the
salary of dental hygienist.222 He refused the position.223
Subsequently, Waddell brought suit and sought relief under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act.224 Both Waddell and Valley Forge filed for summary
judgment.225 Valley Forge admitted that Waddell’s termination resulted solely from
his status has being HIV positive.226 The district court found that Waddell’s job
entailed “exposure prone” procedures.227 The district court ruled in favor of Valley
Forge’s summary judgment. The court held that Waddell posed a direct threat to
others following the standard set forth in Onishea v. Hopper.228 Onishea elaborated
the meaning of a “significant risk.” The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
held that evidence supports a finding of significant risk if it shows that both a
significant event can occur and that according to reliable medical opinions the event
can transmit the disease.229 The court noted that even if the probability of
transmission is low, death itself makes the risk significant.230
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The Waddell appellate court held that the district court properly granted summary
judgment to Valley Forge because Waddell posed a significant risk of HIV
transmission.231 The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The
district court had concentrated on the fourth factor in Arline – the probability of HIV
transmission between a dental hygienist and a patient.232 Reviewing several factors,
such as the proximity of sharp objects and flesh, the appellate court determined that
there was no reasonable accommodation that could be made for Waddell.233
The Eleventh Circuit, however, only discusses a theoretical possibility; it never
considers the probability of an actual occurrence. The risk was admittedly small.
Waddell’s medical expert attested to the fact that the, “hygienist’s fingers and dental
instruments are rarely in the patient’s mouth at the same time.”234 The court’s
opinion discusses the possibility of blood-to-blood contact between Waddell and a
patient.235 According to the law it has to be a significant possibility not just a
“possibility.”236 The Eleventh Circuit, like many courts addressing the issue,
purported to address the fourth factor of Arline, the probability of HIV transmission
between a dental hygienist and patient. The court conceded that, “Waddell
performed some procedures that entailed the use of sharp instruments, there was a
risk that he could cut or prick himself and bleed into an open wound . . . .”237 The
court effectually holds that some risk constitutes a significant risk.
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision conflicts with the preceding authority of
Bragdon and Arline. In Bragdon, the Court held that courts should defer to agency
interpretations.238 The court in Waddell does not rely on medical experts in forming
its opinion. Waddell presented two appellate court amicus briefs from the American
Dental Association and the National Alliance of State and Territorial AIDS Directors
in favor of his position. Additionally, the Infectious Diseases Society and American
Dental Association of America (IDSA) filed briefs with the U.S. Supreme Court.239
Each of these four briefs support Waddell’s claim that he did not pose a significant
risk of transmission when universal precautions were used.240 IDSA and CSTE argue
that, “such determinations by the 11th Circuit and other federal appeals courts are
creating the incorrect presumption that defendants in the position of dental practice
here can claim the ‘direct threat’ defense to an ADA suit against them until there is
absolutely zero risk of disease transmission.”241
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Comparing Waddell to Bragdon, the results are not consistent. In Bragdon, the
United States Supreme Court held that Abbott, the HIV infected person, was
protected under the ADA. The instruments and general procedures which are
involved in both cases are similar. Bragdon was filling a cavity and Waddell
customarily cleaned teeth. The holding in Waddell, denying the healthcare provider
protection under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, is inconsistent with medical
evidence and prior Supreme Court decisions. If the Eleventh Circuit had followed
precedent, the district court’s ruling would have been reversed.
B. Fire
1. Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby
Mandatory testing for the HIV virus is an issue that is prevalent in employment.
Its legitimacy depends on the probability of transmission, in the particular
employment setting. A case that discusses this issue is Anonymous Fireman v. City
of Willoughby.242 Plaintiff, a fireman and paramedic, was transported without any
prior notice to a lab that tested for HIV. He objected to the test but was told that it
was mandatory. The district court addressed the issue if mandatory testing for HIV
violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.243 The city argued
that mandatory testing is proper because “AIDS is an epidemic and firefighters and
paramedics are high-risk employees and are at risk to contract and or transmit the
AIDS in their line of duty.”244 Plaintiff’s position was that this non-consensual
taking of blood is an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.245 The city responded that because the blood was drawn in an annual
physical examination it did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Dr. Leonard
Calabrese, an expert witness for the plaintiff, viewed the occupational risk for
firefighters as well as health care providers to be low for transmitting or being
infected by the HIV virus. Dr. Michael Lederman, another expert witness agreed. 246
The expert witnesses for the defendants stated that universal precautions are not
practical and therefore HIV infected firefighters pose a significant risk to the
public.247
The district court held that mandatory testing of firemen and paramedics for HIV
was legal. The court agreed with defendant’s expert witnesses that universal
precautions were not practical. It held that there was no violation of the Fourth
Amendment because not all searches are unreasonable. Testing firefighters infringed
on minimal privacy interests and therefore was considered reasonable by this court.
Finally, the court rationalized that because of the high-risk nature of the work that
mandatory AIDS testing was legal.248
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From an objective stance, this does not seem logical. The district court does not
realistically view the probability that a transmission would occur, only the harm that
would occur if it did. Universal precautions must be in place according to the law.
If universal precautions are not in place, logically then all public safety and heath
care workers themselves are at risk of being infected by a person that they assist.
Firefighters and health care workers themselves need to be protected from blood
born pathogens. The more significant effect that mandatory AIDS testing has is that
it does not encourage the use of universal precautions. It feeds the stigma associated
with AIDS in that it fosters the belief that HIV is transmitted by casual contact.
VI. CASE LAW SUPPORTING HIV INFECTED PUBLIC SAFETY
AND HEALTHCARE WORKERS
A. Healthcare
1. John Doe v. Oregon Resorts
A different scenario is a case where a man’s wife was infected with the AIDS
virus and he worked on the ski patrol. In John Doe v. Oregon Resorts,249 the
employer alleged that Doe posed a significant risk to others because of his risk of
being HIV-positive. The risk was his association with his HIV infected wife and the
possibility of him contracting the disease and then exposing others to the disease.250
Oregon Resorts mandated that Doe be tested in order to keep his job as a ski
patrolman.251 The duties of ski patrol are to assist other medical personnel such as
intermediate level EMTs and physicians on the mountain.252 These duties may also
include collecting needles when cleaning up an area.253 Ski patrol, are not allowed to
incubate, start IVs, perform injections,254 or perform other invasive procedures.255
This case deals with discrimination by association. The district court held that
the employer violated the ADA when it transferred ski patroller John Doe to another
position.256 The court followed Arline. The court emphasized analyzing the fourth
prong of the test, probability of transmission.257 Relying on expert witnesses,
including Dr. Mark Loveless, the court found the risk to be insignificant.258 Dr.
Loveless noted the extensive studies conducted on HIV and its transmission.259 To
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help illustrate the improbability of John Doe transmitting the disease through his ski
patrol activities, the doctor noted, “[that] plaintiff’s risk of contracting HIV from his
wife through a single sexual episode was low.”260 Another expert witness, Dr.
Chunn “acknowledged that even when health care providers are providing care
involving deep body cavity work where the employer’s hands are not visible, studies
have shown that transmission is rare.”261
Admittedly, this case differs from Mauro or Doe v. Medical Corps., because Joe
Doe position did not require him to use needles, administer IVs, or engage in
invasive procedures. John Doe, however, still came into contact with bleeding
wounds and faced extreme and dangerous conditions.262 Nevertheless the district
court followed the guidelines set forth in Arline, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation
Act. The court deferred to the knowledge of doctors who have studied the risk of
transmission of HIV.263 The court also disclosed that there was a possibility of
transmission, but that the possibility was so low that it [did] not constitute a
“significant risk.”264 In addition, if universal precautions are utilized the statistical
the risk becomes infinitesimal. Doe was entitled to reinstatement to his position as
ski patrolman.265
B. Fire
1. Doe v. District of Columbia
In Doe v. District of Columbia,266 the court held that applicant John Doe
established a prima facie case pursuant to the ADA. Doe applied for a position with
the District of Columbia’s fire department as a firefighter.267 Here, a physical exam
was given, and if the applicant passed the exam he was acknowledged to be fully
capable of performing the duties of a firefighter without risk to himself or others.268
Doe passed the exam and was sent a letter of appointment.269 The letter stated that
Doe was on probationary status during his first year, and if there was any derogatory
information found, he would be terminated.270 Fearful that his HIV-positive status
would be discovered, he called an official at the fire department and disclosed that he
was infected with the disease.271 He was told not to report for duty.272 He was never
260
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told that the decision to hire him was rescinded nor was he told to come into work.273
Doe thereinafter sued the District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983274 and the Rehabilitation
Act.275
The district court held that the city violated the Rehabilitation Act.276 The district
court reassured that the firefighters wear protective gear when they are performing
their job responsibilities.277 The gear includes a helmet, hood, bunker coat, bunker
pants, gloves, and bunker boots,278 all of which are made of heavy, thick material.
An expert witness, Dr. Parenti, Associate Professor of Medicine in the Division of
Infectious Disease at George Washington University Medical Center in Washington,
D.C., testified that an asymptomatic HIV-positive person has no impairment of his
physical capabilities such as his strength, agility, or ability to breathe.279 It is
difficult to transfer the HIV virus. This is reflected by the low percentage of health
care workers that have contracted the disease on the job.280 According to Dr. Parenti
“there is ‘no measurable’ risk that the disease will be transmitted through
performance of fire fighting duties . . . .”281 He equated the possibility of
transmitting the disease while on the job with the probability of “getting struck by a
meteor while walking down Constitution Avenue in Washington D.C..”282 Katherine
West, a certified nurse in the specialty of infection control at the Association for
Practitioners in Infection Control, supports this finding.283 She is employed at the
George Washington University School of Medicine and Health Sciences in
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Washington D.C..284 She testified that all the protective gear that the firefighters
utilize eliminates the risk of blood-to-blood contact. She is quoted as saying that the
risk of HIV transmission is “so remote” and “extremely small.”285 She also attested
to the fact that several fire departments throughout the United States employ HIVpositive firefighters in active-duty status.286 In addition there are no reported cases of
HIV transmission during the course of fire fighting duties.287 Both Dr. Parenti and
Ms. West found that an HIV-infected person poses no measurable risk of
transmitting the disease through the performance of fire fighting duties.288
The district court found Doe passed the physical examination and was able to do
the job sufficiently before the city discovered that Doe was HIV-positive.289 Doe’s
HIV status did not impair his ability to perform his duties as a firefighter. The
district court followed the guidelines of Arline and deferred to the experts.290 It
emphasized that the testimony was uncontested. The evidence supported the court’s
finding that an HIV asymptomatic firefighter poses no measurable risk of
transmitting the disease.291 The defense failed to rebut Doe’s prima facie showing
that he was discriminated against because of his HIV-positive status.292 The court
ordered that Doe be reinstated, that the city pay him back - pay with interest, and
compensatory damages of $25,000 and attorney fees and court costs.293 The court
gave a very strong statement about fostering fear and misguided apprehension.
“In the context of race the Supreme Court, has warned: The Constitution cannot
control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly give them
effect.
‘Public officials sworn to uphold the Constitution may not avoid a
constitutional duty by bowing to the hypothetical effects of private racial prejudice
that they assume to be both widely and deeply held.’”294
C. Police
1. Holiday v. City of Chattanooga
Holiday v. City of Chattanooga295 involved a police officer who was denied
employment with the city solely because he was HIV-positive. In 1993, Holiday
284

Id. at 564.

285

Id.

286

Id.

287

District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. at 564.

288

Id.

289

Id. at 566.

290

Id. at 569.

291

Id. at 563.

292

Id. at 570.

293

Id. at 573.

294

Id. at 571 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).

295

Holiday v. City of Chattanooga, 206 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2000).

2004-05]

OCCUPATIONAL RISK: THE OUTRAGEOUS REACTION

69

submitted an application to the City for employment in its police department. He
subsequently took a written examination and completed a physical agility test.296 He
was invited for an interview and was granted a conditional offer of employment
subject to a physical and psychological exam.297 During the exam, Holiday
voluntarily told the doctor that he had been diagnosed with HIV and that he was
anemic.298 The doctor told him that he passed the exam.299 However, an employee
from the doctor’s called the police department and informed them that Holiday had
failed the physical.300 The doctor said Holiday was weak and unable to perform the
work.301 However, in actuality he was asymptomatic.302 Louis Holiday brought suit
against the City of Chattanooga under the ADA, charging that the city refused to hire
him as a police officer because he was infected with HIV.303
The district court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment.304 It held that
Holiday did not show that he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential
functions of the job.305 The Sixth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment
de novo.306 The court of appeals found that the district court made no individualized
inquiry regarding Holiday.307 The ADA mandates an individualized inquiry in
determining whether an employee’s disability or other condition disqualifies him
from a particular position.308 There was no evidence that proved that Holiday could
not perform the job properly.309 He was asymptomatic at the time of his physical
examination with Dr. Dowlen.310 At the time of the examination, Dr. Dowlen made
no assessments as to if Holiday was experiencing any fatique, sluggishness, or
shortness of breath.311 The Sixth Circuit held that granting summary judgment was
improper because there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Holiday
was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of a police officer. When
Holiday inquired as to why he was not hired the city’s office administrator told him
296
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that she could not, “put other employee’s at risk by hiring [him] . . . .”312 This
emphasizes the point that the job offer was contingent on Holiday’s HIV status. The
city’s conclusion had no medical support. At the court of appeals, the city changed
its position conceding that Holiday posed no threat to the health and safety of
others.313
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.314 The
Sixth Circuit held that Holiday was entitled to be evaluated on his abilities and
relevant medical evidence rather than on “fear, ignorance, or misconceptions.”315
They also found that Holiday adduced sufficient evidence from which a jury could
conclude that the city refused to hire him because he was HIV-positive.316
Comparatively, the Sixth Circuit did not make the same type of review and
analysis in Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center as they did in Holiday. Both Mauro
and Holiday argued that their respective district courts erred in concluding that there
was no genuine issue of material fact.317 In Holiday, the court went through a
systematic analysis of the four factors in Arline and whether the City had made an
individualized inquiry. The court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact did
exist. It discussed that the opinion of one doctor was not sufficient for the City or
the district court to conclude that Holiday was not qualified for a position as a police
officer. In the opinion the Sixth Circuit stated, “courts need not defer to an
individual’s doctor’s opinion that is neither based on the individualized inquiry
mandated by the ADA nor supported by objective scientific medical evidence.”318
In addition, the court discussed the objective evidence. First Holiday was
asymptomatic and showed no physical signs of the infection; indeed he was in good
physical condition. The court examined what a typical police officer may encounter
on the job. The judges stated that the use of force, wrestling, and striking suspects
may result in injury to both the police officer and the suspect, but the court
concluded that in light of the objective medical evidence, the risk of transmitting
HIV was so low that it is not significant. Under the ADA the risk must be significant
for an individual not to be protected.
The Sixth Circuit in Mauro, two years prior to Holiday, did not make this
individualized analysis. Mauro argued that the probability of transmission was so
slight that it did not constitute a significant risk. Mauro presented the evidence of
CDC recommendations regarding HIV employees that states the risk from healthcare
worker to patient is very small.319 The court viewed the report as not complete. The
report differentiated between exposure prone and invasive procedures. To perform
exposure prone procedures strict guidelines should be followed and an expert panel
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should advise. For an invasive procedure the universal precautions are sufficient.
Mauro usually did not even assist in surgery. His job duties mainly included giving
the necessary surgical instrument(s) to the doctor during surgery.320 The court
rejected Mauro’s argument on the ground that because some risk existed Mauro
posed a direct threat to the safety of others.
In both cases some risk existed. In Holiday it was a police officer that might get
injured during a pursuit of a suspect. In Mauro it was a surgical technician that on
rare occasion assisted a surgeon for a brief moment. Arguably, on a daily basis
Holiday had more direct contact with open wounds than Mauro because job duties of
a police officer include wrestling and striking to subdue suspects.321 Mauro
infrequently assisted with surgeries. Therefore Holiday probably posed a greater risk
than Mauro to the safety of others. However, the Sixth Circuit did not rule or
analyze the cases similarly. This is consistent with the impression that the court’s
reasoning is based not on logic but on fear.
2. Doe v. Chicago
The district court in Doe v. Chicago322 reviewed a motion to dismiss a claim
alleging violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Illinois AIDS Confidentiality Act.323 John and Jane applied for
positions as police officers.324 Both applicants passed the written and psychological
examinations.325 The City of Chicago Police Department tested Joe and Jane Doe for
HIV without their consent.326 Additionally, their applications for jobs as police
officers were rejected solely because they were HIV positive.327 John Doe received a
conditional offer of employment, prior to the physical fitness examination conducted
by Dr. Bransfield.328 Jane Doe did not receive an offer.329 Neither plaintiff gave
consent to the HIV test, nor were provided counseling prior to the testing.330
Afterward both plaintiffs were notified that they were HIV positive and they were
not provided with any counseling.331 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
maintained a “custom, practice, or policy” of: “1) testing candidates for HIV as a
condition of employment without medical justification; 2) requiring a physical
examination prior to proving candidates with a valid conditional offer of
320
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employment; 3) failing to obtain consent or provide counseling with regard to HIV
tests; and 4) refusing to hire candidates solely because of their HIV-positive
status.”332 The city moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that the plaintiffs failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.333
The district court analyzed the testing provision of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs alleged that the city used the result of the medical tests
to discriminate against them. The court found that discriminatory use of medical
testing is specifically prohibited under Section 504.334 The court held that the city
was not testing in order to determine an applicant’s ability to perform the job.335 The
court stated that the “defendants acted knowingly and intentionally . . . and with
reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ rights.”336 The court ruled that the
city’s attempt to dismiss plaintiffs’ Section 504 claims of the Rehabilitation Act was
moot.337
VII. CONCLUSION
People in the United States need to gain control of the unfounded but prevalent
fear of casual contact with HIV. It has been twenty years since AIDS was first
mentioned. The treatment surrounding the disease is similar to the treatment of those
that supported communism in the 1950s. Early in the 1950’s in the era of
McCarthyism, artists were blacklisted and many others lost employment because of
an incredible fear of communism. One of the earliest cases was Dennis v. United
States.338 The defendants, were supporters and advocates of communism, convicted
for conspiring to overthrow the government.339 In Dennis those that were on trial
were convicted on the basis of a modified version of the clear and present danger
formula.340 The test was, if the gravity of the evil discounted by its improbability
justifies an invasion of free speech it is necessary to avoid the danger. In Dennis,
people were convicted on the premise that they believed in an idea. In light of the
enormity of the evil apprehended, overthrowing the U.S. government, the Court was
focused simply upon the possibility, not the probability of its occurrence. It was not
until 1957, when the convictions of fourteen “second string” communist leaders
reached the Supreme Court in Yates v. U.S.,341 that McCarthy had died, and so had
McCarthyism. Strong anticommunist sentiment persisted but the analysis of the risk
was construed differently. In Yates, Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, acquitted
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the five defendants and remanded to the lower court for proceedings against the other
defendants.342 The Court distinguished advocacy of forcible overthrow as an abstract
idea from advocacy of action. Punishment is not justified for simply advocating the
overthrow of the government but must include specifically promoting obstruction of
the government. After McCarthyism ended, people were prosecuted if they had the
intent to do harm. The assessment of risk differs in the latter case because there is
more of an emphasis on the likelihood of the harm occurring rather than just the idea
of it happening.
The similarity between the strong anti-communist movement and the treatment of
those HIV-positive is that both are supported by fear instead of rational and logic.
Akin to this is the treatment of AIDS. Millions of dollars have been dedicated for
research on the disease. A number of studies and the leading government agency,
the CDC, all have supported the continuation of public safety and healthcare workers
in their professions. The courts have not adhered to the medical evidence or CDC
guidelines when determining cases.
The assessment of risk is the disparity between the cases that support HIV
individuals keeping their jobs and those cases that do not. Courts vary on how
closely they examine the objective evidence that is presented to them. There is also
a large discrepancy as to what is considered a “significant risk”. The courts that are
supportive of a healthcare or public safety employee continuing in his position
follow the guidelines set forth by the Rehabilitation Act and ADA. They carefully
scrutinize the possibility of transmission. These courts typically do not adhere to the
misperception and fear surrounding HIV/AIDS. Courts have difficulty in dealing
with assessment of risk where there is an ultimate risk involved. Now, twenty years
into the epidemic, the risk is four persons assisted out of every hundred billion
contacts. As Judge Boggs’ dissent in Mauro emphasized, the assessment of risk is
subjective.343 There are people that go bungee jumping and then there are others that
refuse to fly. The chance of being struck by lightening is much higher than the
probability of contracting HIV from a public safety or healthcare provider. Society
goes about its business during electrical storms, but despite the much lower risk,
many courts have not permitted HIV positive health care and safety workers to
continue in their occupations. There is a degree of risk to every human behavior.
The issue is does an infinitesimal risk justify a growing population of HIV positive
persons being cast out of occupations. The “[f]ear of harm ought to be proportional
not merely to the gravity of the harm, but also to the probability of the event.”344
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